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Abstract
“Systemic risk” now occupies centre stage in discussions of bank regulatory reform. Systemic
risk is often seen as a problem of size, operational complexity, interconnectivity and contagion.
It is less often discussed in terms of the institutional framework of legal rules and principles
within which financial intermediation takes place, and the organizational culture promoted by
those structures. In this article we redress this deficit through an appraisal of Northern Rock,
illustrating the consequences of its transformation from mutually owned building society to
publicly held company on organisational culture. These changes had profound effects on the
incentive structure of its owners and managers, as profit-maximisation and shareholder value
became the driving force within the firm, as in much of the rest of the UK banking sector. Thus,
in addition to grappling with risk and uncertainty—and taking care to distinguish between
the two—current efforts to construct a new macro-prudential regulatory paradigm should
recognise the importance of Frank Knight’s third key conceptual category–profit. Furthermore,
in seeking to understand systemic risk, it becomes necessary to delve into micro-legal concepts
such as property, trust, and contract that govern different forms of business to discern whether
or not some modes of financial association create a greater degree of systemic risk than others.
This is especially so when one organizational model comes to dominate retail markets, as did
the publicly held company in the UK banking sector at the turn of the twenty-first century.
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The premise in antitrust analysis is that more competition is good for welfare, 
especially given its focus on consumers. Could banking, however, be special in 
this sense? Is more competition always good? Is it possible that too much 
competition is problematic in banking, where externalities on risk taking may 
lead to systemic crises? (Dick and Hannan 2012: 425) 
1 Introduction 
In his influential Economics, Paul Samuelson defined the discipline per tradition as 
the scientific study of efficiently dealing with scarcity (2010: 4). Today that 
definition of economics appears antiquated. Instead ‘risk’ has replaced ‘scarcity’ as 
the key concept around which much of the literature is organized. Here the shifting 
emphasis placed on these theoretical categories can be understood historically, as 
more generally reflecting the changing ways business is conducted in practice. In 
particular, modern risk discourse gained prominence following the economic crisis 
of the 1970s, which weakened the salience of both post-War Keynesian 
macroeconomics and the government-centred growth plans that paradigm 
intellectually underpinned (Postone 2012: 227). Set against the subsequent 
background of capital liberalisation and the globalisation of production, private risk 
management strategies emerged to replicate the investment predictability previously 
afforded by sovereign state regulation (most notably fixed currency exchange rates) 
but which, by the 1980s, for various reasons, had lost both political persuasiveness 
and economic efficacy (LiPuma and Lee 2004). Insofar as financial contracts such 
as derivatives became the main instruments by which big businesses started 
managing risk, this perforce bolstered the role played by the financial sector in the 
economy and thus the prominence of concepts from finance in economic theory 
(Crouhy et al. 2006: 37). And what makes the financial sector unique is that its 
products are not constrained by naturally scarce inputs. For instance, when a bank 
writes contingent commitments like credit cards, it does not do so primarily by 
reference to scarce savings but by evaluating the trade-off between expected profits 
and default risk (Moore 1979; Lavoie 1984; Wray 1990; Desai 1991; Goodhart 
2010). 
Taking care to observe the contingent and context-specific conditions favouring 
the recent success of modern risk discourse is not an arcane matter for intellectual 
historians but directly relevant to the future of the economy. Arguably the current 
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crisis has as one of its sources an insufficient sensitivity to history among financial 
agents who wrongly believed that ‘this time was different,’ to invoke the fortuitous 
phrase of Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). In part, the forgetting of economic history by 
financial agents, as well as an inadequate self-understanding of the partiality and 
thus incompleteness of their own taken-for-granted terms, can also be understood 
within context, as exacerbated in the last thirty years by the predominant shift of 
economics away from the study of large-scale historical patterns to focus instead on 
apparently timeless problems in microeconomics such as asymmetric information 
and adverse selection (Postone 2012: 246).  
Noting the historical specificity of risk discourse thus matters to the extent that it 
marks the non-necessity of this framing and raises awareness that the real world 
facts which “systemic risk” is meant to capture could be described otherwise.1 The 
terms in which problems are cast matters because they suggest certain remedial 
actions rather than others (Hayek 1973: 61). For instance, if recent events are a 
“business cycle,” this terminology naturalises them and suggests they are 
unpreventable.2 By contrast, employing the term “systemic risk” implies that crises 
are manageable and measurable with the proper forecasting and macro-prudential 
tools. The fundamental question this special issue of Economics thus raises is 
whether “systemic risk” grasps the problem it purports to do, or recapitulates a 
paradigm that itself has conceptual problems. There are reasons for scepticism. For 
instance, in the period immediately preceding the crisis, the risk-weighted assets 
(RWAs) of the four largest UK-headquartered banks were falling precisely when it 
appears risks to the banking system and for the broader economy were building 
(Independent Commission on Banking 2011: 98). Thus in the same historical 
moment when risk-based discourse has proliferated, there has ironically been an 
increasing incidence of financial crises or “systemic risk” (Wolf 2008; cf. Laeven 
and Valencia 2008). 
_________________________ 
1 The roots of risk discourse (as distinct from its preponderance) can be found in the nineteenth 
century, part and parcel of a larger embrace of probabilistic reasoning in the Anglo-American world 
(Hacking 1990; Bernstein 1998).  
2 In fact, banking crises are institutionally contingent. As the distinguished British banking historian 
Forrest Capie (2011: 4) has pointed out, “Fractional reserve banking is a pre-requisite for financial 
crises…it is difficult to see how a banking crisis…gets underway before there has developed a banking 
multiplier of some significance…In England it is not until the beginning of the nineteenth century that 
that point is reached.”  
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In particular, one of the problems with the concept of “systemic risk” is the 
analytical imprecision which arises from the multiple meanings currently attached to 
it. As a recent Bank for International Settlements paper noted “a precise definition of 
systemic risk is still lacking” (Cerutti et al. 2012: 1, fn. 2). However, although it 
remains a contested term, there is some convergence toward common usage in the 
literature.3 Specifically, many scholars define “systemic risk” as the chance that all 
or a large portion of the financial system fails (Beale et al. 2011). In many instances, 
the sources of “systemic risk” are identified as common exposures that propagate 
problems at a single firm across several. The exact channels of contagion can be 
direct or indirect (Dow 2000: 5).4 For example, direct channels of contagion include 
payment settlement delays and interbank exposures, particularly when firms have 
interconnected, concentrated funding. Viewed from the other side of the ledger, 
indirect channels of contagion also exist. In many stylized models of systemic risk, 
solvency shocks at one firm can lead to their selling assets, depressing their market 
price more generally, leading to losses at other firms similarly exposed, particularly 
under a mark-to-market accounting regime (Allen and Carletti 2008). At the same 
time, declines in asset prices reduce the value of collateral and thus the availability 
of bank loans to borrowers (Bernanke et al 1998). Cumulatively, this can cause the 
banking system to deleverage, shrinking the money supply, with spill-over effects 
on output and employment in other sectors of the economy because of declines in 
the volume and increases in the price of credit, given sticky wages and nominally 
fixed liabilities.5   
Although illuminating, the key limitations with these stylized models of 
systemic risk is their identifying mechanisms which magnify shocks but often 
without explaining their fundamental source. Furthermore, the crisis is grasped 
belatedly and superficially if primarily understood as a “credit crunch.” On the 
_________________________ 
3 A common but crude use of the term ‘systemic’ is to attach that label to particular firms because they 
are large in terms of their assets or because of their role in the payment system. However, the 
conflation of particular firms with the system undermines its intent by creating an implicit subsidy for 
those firms, potentially contributing to the very problem such labeling is meant to identify. More 
generally, the equation of systemic risk with risk to “systemically important financial institutions” 
overlooks the fact that what constitutes a systemically important institution depends on context; the 
insolvency of even a small or medium sized bank can have large-scale ramifications in a heightened 
period of financial stress. 
4 The term ‘contagion’ signals a shift in economics away from metaphors like equilibrium drawn from 
physics and toward those drawn from biology (Erturk et al. 2011). 
5 Here the recent literature owes an often unacknowledged debt to Fisher (1933). 
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contrary, there is an emerging consensus that the crisis was caused in the first 
instance by asset price inflation, particularly in the financial, insurance, and real 
estate (FIRE) sectors (Pozsar et al. 2010; International Monetary Fund 2011; Lo 
Duca and Peltonen 2011; Schularick and Taylor 2011).6 Within global financial 
markets, sources of asset price inflation included practices such as re-hypothecation, 
pyramiding, stock repurchases, and double leverage (Gorton 2010; Geanakoplos 
2010; Lazonick 2012).7 As well—and with particular acuity in the UK—asset price 
inflation has been correlated with a rapid expansion of bank credit to the economy, 
captured by a ratio of credit-to-GDP exceeding long-term trends (Bank of England 
2011: 11).8 Consequently, the balance sheets of British banks now exceed the size 
of other UK financial sectors, with much of this growth starting just prior to the 
millennium (Davies et al. 2010: 325). The critical question is why.  
Here we take inspiration from the father of modern risk discourse, Frank Knight. 
As is well-known, Knight (2010) posited an analytical distinction between risk and 
uncertainty, defining the former as events reducible to a probability distribution with 
a high confidence interval, while denoting by the latter events whose frequency and 
timing are unknown and possibly unknowable (Herring 2011). In subsequent 
iterations of Knight’s ideas this distinction has been blurred. In banking this has in 
part occurred because of the proliferation of value-at-risk (VaR) calculations that try 
specifying probability values and numerical thresholds of unexpected losses (Sollis 
2009). Consequently much of what is ordinarily encompassed under the category of 
risk is really uncertainty (King 2004). But even less minded than the subtle 
distinction between risk and uncertainty is their relation to the third but often 
neglected term in Knight’s troika—profit.9 
_________________________ 
6 Between 1998 and 2008 sterling loans from British banks to financial companies grew by over 200 
percent relative to GDP, compared to 50 and 60 percent for the household and private non-financial 
sectors, respectively (Independent Commission on Banking 2011: 50). 
7 Pyramiding involves using the increasing value of assets to purchase more assets. Re-hypothecation 
is the reuse by a creditor of collateral pledged by a borrower to secure the creditor’s own borrowings 
(Kettering 1999). Stock repurchases involve a corporation buying back its own shares so as to increase 
the price and trading volume of the stock. Double leverage describes a situation where holding 
companies raise debt on top of the debt raised by their subsidiaries. 
8 The ‘Great Moderation’ may also have been its own undoing, with stability breeding instability in the 
form of over-exuberant optimism which also contributed to rising asset prices (Minsky 1991). 
9 According to Knight, the intractable endurance of uncertainty—even at the level of our own personal 
preferences, which are often revised by “stimulus and suggestion” (1997: 42)—explains why some 
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In response, this article seeks to link the concept of “systemic risk” to the issue 
of the profit rate in the banking system. In particular, we observe that material 
changes in corporate governance and the competitive environment which place 
greater pressure on banks to return profits, while simultaneously or subsequently 
decreasing the actual profit rate of their banking books, create conditions ripe for 
crisis by inducing banks to assume new risks. As per convention, the profit rate of 
the banking book may be measured by net interest margin (NIM), a ratio expressing 
net interest income relative to average interest-earning assets. Thus although profits 
before tax for the Major British Banking Groups (MBBG) increased in the years 
leading up to the crisis, NIM across the sector actually decreased (Figure 1).10 With 
the rate of return on their banking book reduced, MBBG responded by pursuing 
trading and fee income, which rose to nearly 60 percent of their profits, having been 
a minor component three decades ago (Davies et al. 2010: 324).11 To the extent that 
non-interest income was generated via securitisation, these developments inflated 
the supply of credit which, viewed retrospectively as an equal and opposite 
accounting entry, generated debt in excess of obligors’ capacity to make good on 
their promises to pay. 
In this article we do not aim to add to the many excellent general surveys and 
formal models of systemic risk within the economics literature (De Bandt et al. 
2012). Rather, our aim is to flesh out how systemic risk developed concretely in our 
historical period through changes in the management, organisation, and culture of 
British banks. In particular, our article focuses on how systemic risk crystallized at 
and through Northern Rock, a firm whose crisis we have both explored in-depth 
(Bholat et al. 2012; Gray and Akseli 2011). As Figure 1 reveals, Northern Rock had 
the lowest NIM among MBBG before the crisis. Northern Rock thus embodied, in 
highly concentrated form, a wider trend in British banking. Although Northern Rock 
was largely a domestic bank, its special significance in making the larger global 
_________________________ 
firms return profits and others loss (cf. Obrinsky 1983). Robb (2009) has written an innovative paper 
further developing the implications of Knightian uncertainty for microeconomics. 
10 Major British Banking Groups is an aggregate category produced by the British Bankers’ 
Association composed of Santander UK Group, Alliance & Leicester Group, Barclays Group, Bradford 
& Bingley Plc (up to and including 2009), HBOS Banking Group, Lloyds Banking Group, HSBC Bank 
Group, Lloyds TSB Group, Northern Rock, and the Royal Bank of Scotland Group. 
11 Not coincidentally, as bank tellers were transformed into sellers of a myriad of financial products 
(Rogers 1999), conduct at the retail banking level appears to have suffered, with successive incidences 
of widespread mis-selling of retail financial products payment protection insurance being the most 
recent example (BBC News 9 May 2011).  
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crisis is widely recognized by scholars, with prominent Princeton economist Hyun 
Shin’s (2009) commenting that Northern Rock was “the bank run that heralded the  
 
Figure 1: Net Interest Margin, Major British Banking Groups and Northern Rock 
 
Data Source: British Bankers’ Association. 
Notes: The data points between 1996-2003 are stated on a UK GAAP basis. From 2004 on the data is 
stated according to IFRS. 
financial crisis.” Northern Rock’s crisis particularly resonated on local and national 
scales. At the time of its 2007 crisis, Northern Rock was the largest private sector 
employer in North East England (Walters 2008: xi) and the fifth-largest lender by 
mortgage assets in the UK (Brummer 2008: 12). 
There already exists an established economics literature on Northern Rock, 
focused mainly on explaining the firm’s crisis as a function of its dependence on 
wholesale funding and mortgage securitisation (Weale 2007; Chick 2008; Milne and 
Wood 2008; Rafferty 2008; Congdon 2009; Hamalainen 2009). But while this 
explanation is correct as regards the immediate cause, it begs the question when and 
why the firm developed this business model in the first place. Here what needs to be 
stressed is not only that Northern Rock sold mortgages in secondary markets, but 
0
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also the relatively novel fact that equity in the firm was sold at all. Dating back to 
the nineteenth century, Northern Rock operated as a mutual building society for 
most of its history. As a mutual society, its shares were held by its users (depositors 
and borrowers) and the firm operated by legal statute on the philanthropic premise 
of increasing home ownership. But in 1997, Northern Rock converted to a 
corporation listed on the London Stock Exchange, part and parcel a larger 
demutualisation wave of British building societies. But the intervening years have 
shown a misplaced faith on the part of those who ‘converted’ (Warner 1997). All 
eleven building societies that demutualised in the 1990s have since lost their 
operational independence, either because they have been acquired by other banks, or 
because they have received public bailout, such as Bradford & Bingley and Northern 
Rock (Marshall et al. 2011: 26). The impact of these developments on the structure 
of the UK residential mortgage market has been profound. Between 1945 and 1980, 
building societies consistently originated over 80 percent of all mortgages in Britain 
(Watson 2004). But by 1997, the building societies’ share of mortgages was reduced 
to one-quarter (Stephens 2001: 336) and 65 percent of the sector’s assets had been 
transferred to the corporate banking sector (Drake 1997: 1).  
In thus setting Northern Rock’s crisis within the longer context of British 
building society demutualisation, this article aims to remedy some of the historical 
deficit in the systemic risk literature we made note of at the start. It also aims to add 
depth to the existing scholarship on Northern Rock by detailing the business model 
and management philosophies behind the firm’s spectacular rise and fall on the basis 
of detailed analysis of annual reports and accounts, interviews, and archival 
research. In addition, by emphasising the historical novelty of British banks 
prominence in the UK residential mortgage market, the article has relevance for 
policy debates today. Many analysts have argued that the practice of mortgage 
securitisation was responsible for the crisis at Northern Rock and other banks. The 
basic argument is that securitization created perverse incentives for banks to 
originate mortgages without due regard to credit risk, since these loans could be sold 
off-balance sheet to investors (Morris 2008). However, as more acute analyses have 
revealed, this argument oversimplifies the behaviour of banks. Banks as a sector 
remained significantly exposed to securitized mortgages through the holding of their 
own or other banks’ mortgage-backed securities (MBS), as well as through credit 
guarantees to special purpose investment vehicles and conduits selling MBS 
(Acharya et al. 2009: 21; Calomiris 2008: 34). As this article argues, this implies 
that the interesting issue is not mortgage securitization per se but, more precisely, 
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the preference of banks to hold mortgages as assets, which is a recent development 
since the 1980s. At least in the UK case, emphasizing the novelty of mortgage 
securitization skips a step, passing over the more fundamental question of when, 
why, and with what impact mortgages became important to the asset portfolio of 
banks. 
Finally, in placing emphasis on “risk-inviting rules” in banking (Calomiris 2010) 
such as insurance for depositors and limited liability for investors, our article 
endeavours to show how legal structures writ large foment system-wide risk. From 
our perspective, the current crisis has thus been ‘legal’ as much as it has been 
‘economic’. Critical legal distinctions between branches and subsidiaries (Wade 
2009), encumbered versus unencumbered assets (Deryugina 2009), and between 
default and bankruptcy, attained significance over the course of the crisis to an 
extent many equilibrium models in economics inadequately capture.12 In particular, 
as this article illustrates with reference to Northern Rock, the crucial legal shift from 
mutual cooperatives to limited liability corporations as the key commercial 
enterprises responsible for writing residential mortgages may have been an 
important factor in structurally propagating systemic risk across the British banking 
system in recent years.  
2 Building “Society” 
Northern Rock’s roots reach back to 1849 when the Newcastle upon Tyne and 
Northern Counties Freehold Land Society was established by a group of 
townspeople “with the object of purchasing land on which to build houses for the 
deserving and thrifty” (Aris 2000: 12). At inception, the Northern Counties Freehold 
Land Society was a building society in the literal sense of an organisation engaged 
in the collective purchase and building of houses for its 300 members (Bab 1938: 
56). Although the chief advantage for members was their ability to purchase land at 
wholesale prices, the society was also formed with the ambition of helping members 
gain the right to vote, given various property qualifications then applicable in 
_________________________ 
12 As Goodhart (2009) has pointed out, most dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models are 
premised on real business cycle theory, where shocks are exogenous and the transversality condition 
rules out defaults and minimize the role of money and banks. In other words, they make residual what 
distinguishes monetary from barter economies (Ingham 2004).  
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England (Boléat 1987: 3). With housing complete, the Northern Counties Freehold 
Land Society was wound down after a year.  
Soon thereafter, another Newcastle-based building society modelled on the first 
society was started. But the new firm differed organisationally from its predecessor. 
As Stephen Aris (2000: 23) in his excellent official history of Northern Rock notes:  
The trades-people and shopkeepers were in a majority on the board, and it was 
they who set the tone this time, rather than the politically motivated lawyers and 
other professionals. Much less was to be heard about providing decent housing 
for the deserving poor, and much more about the excellent returns available on a 
pre-eminently safe investment. The accent was more on money and its 
accumulation than on land and its development. 
This change in organisational culture was reflected in the changed legal 
architecture of the new enterprise. Whereas the mandate of the original society had 
been to house a particular set of people, the new society was founded to operate in 
perpetuity. Furthermore, the changed emphasis on “the building society as a home 
for savings rather than saving for a home” (Aris: 19) expressed itself in the fact that 
the new society began to offer interest on deposits—and in step started charging 
interest on loans. As Aris notes, “the introduction of preference and paid-up shares 
(the latter being a full value share available to non-subscribers) was a watershed” 
because it created “a lump sum investment pure and simple with no direct 
connection with house purchase or home ownership” (Aris: 46–47). 
The local development of the Northern Counties Permanent Benefit Building 
and Investment Society over the next century mirrored the broader national 
trajectory of building societies in Britain. As late as 1950, the market for residential 
mortgage finance was small, primarily because only 25 percent of UK households at 
that point in time were owner-occupiers (Cook et al. 2001: 10). But between 1950 
and 1980, the number of homeowners doubled, reflecting rises in real median 
incomes and changes in consumer preferences.13 Northern Rock proper was born 
against this backdrop, the product of a 1965 merger between the Northern Counties 
_________________________ 
13 Government policy played a role in shaping this preference because of government tax relief on 
mortgage interest and capital gains tax exemption on real estate transactions (Fforde 1983: 369). 
Government policy also played a role on the supply side, with rent controls constricting the supply of 
private lets, such that by the late 1970s, the choice for British households in terms of mode of dwelling 
was limited to owner-occupation or public housing. Furthermore, the implementation of the Housing 
Act 1980 giving tenants in council houses the option to buy properties at reduced properties transferred 
630,000 dwellings to the private sector retail mortgage market in its first four years (Dicks 1988: 36). 
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Permanent Benefit and Investment Building Society and the Rock Building Society, 
another North East organisation founded in 1865. While the newly amalgamated 
society continued to focus on making mortgages within the North East, the broader 
national demand for residential mortgage finance offered a rationale for the firm’s 
strategy of pursuing growth through acquisitions. From the launch of the new firm in 
1965 until 1997, Northern Rock bought 53 other building societies, mostly in the 
North East (Walters 2008: 5). 
It is noteworthy that while the post-war boom in owner occupation and housing 
construction benefitted building societies like Northern Rock, British banks 
generally issued less than 5 percent of residential mortgages during this period. This 
continued a historical pattern; traditionally, British banks concentrated their 
portfolios in short-term assets such as bills of exchange and rolling overdrafts. In 
fact, long-term lending or maturity transformation— particularly for housing with 
the exception of loans secured on large gentry owned estates—was generally 
considered imprudent within banking circles, in part because of the association of 
such advances with populist organisations such as building societies and land banks 
(Rogers 2007). Moreover, even if they wanted to compete in the residential 
mortgage market, British banks in the post-war period could not have easily availed 
themselves of the discretionary funds to do so. During the 1950s and 1960s, British 
banks often held two-thirds of their assets in the form of gilts and government 
securities because of lending controls put in place to fight inflation and maintain the 
convertibility of the pound under the Bretton Woods system (Congdon 2011: 64).14 
In spite of holding most of their assets in highly marketable but relatively low 
yield securities, firms enjoyed healthy rates of profitability because the ‘Big Five’ 
_________________________ 
14 During the nineteenth century, financial capital flowed freely out of Britain at rates relative to output 
that are still unprecedented today (Dintenfass 1992: 43). Capital controls in the twentieth century first 
emerged as weapons in the arsenal of the British government in a very literal sense (Artis and Taylor 
1989). They were enacted at the start of the Great War to pay for soldiers and supplies. Although these 
controls ended in 1925, they returned for the same reasons in 1939 (Wood 1985). They continued to 
exist after the War because of prominent Keynesian arguments that capital controls “should be a 
permanent feature of the post-war system” (Keynes, as quoted in McKinnon 1993: 13). This followed 
from the perception that capital flows had prolonged the Great Depression (Bordo 1992: 12). During 
the Depression, as prices fell, expected profitability did as well, leading investors to sell the pound. 
Although officials tried to re-attract investors by raising interest rates, they did so at a time when, from 
a proto-Keynesian view, they ironically needed to be reduced (Mishkin 1999: 7-8). Article VI of the 
Bretton Woods agreement encouraged countries to use capital controls to achieve full employment and 
domestic growth, notably through regulation of overseas securities investment (Miller and Wood 1979: 
44). 
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banks operated a de facto oligopoly. Consequently, the role of profits as a 
meaningful category for bankers was very different in the post-war period than it is 
today. In part, this stemmed from the fact that British banks did not publish their 
true profits until 1969, so banks and their investors could not easily compare 
financial performance across firms (Capie and Billings 2004: 71). Consequently, 
bank dividends remained constant for long intervals, and bank stock tended to be 
regarded as fixed interest securities by investors (Capie and Billings 2001: 387). 
More generally, the culture within British banks was fundamentally different than 
their current culture.15 As Charles Goodhart (2011: 139–140) has described the 
situation with characteristic wit: 
There was no call for financial innovation; bank manager were trained to say 
‘no,’ rather than ‘yes;’ and they, and their counterparts in mortgage banking, 
followed the 3:6:3 rule, i.e. borrow at 3 percent, lend at 6 percent and on the golf 
course by 3 p.m. Lunches were long and liquid. 
Speaking about shareholder value and profit maximisation within this context 
would be anachronistic. Whatever the resulting inefficiencies and inequities within 
British banks during this period—and no doubt they were legion—the system 
produced stable profits for firms and thus financial stability. Suffice to recall that the 
safety of the system was such that until 1973 the Bank of England employed just 
one senior official to oversee supervision of the entire financial sector (Capie et al. 
1994: 74).  
However, changes in British banks’ competitive environment began with the 
implementation of a more liberal regulatory regime in 1971 shorthanded 
Competition and Credit Control “after the document that had preceded the 
implementation of the changes” (Moran 1984: 2).16 As well, starting in the 1970s, 
banks’ profits were pinched from both sides of the balance sheet. Specifically, the 
emergence of mutual and pension funds caused disintermediation, reducing banks’ 
retail funding. As a consequence of this shift in household savings, a mass market 
_________________________ 
15 Historically, the boards of British banks consisted of local aristocrats and so-called “Johnny 
Seventeens” i.e. non-university educated, lower middle class persons who had worked themselves up to 
the boardroom from clerk level. But starting in the late 1970s, British banks followed the lead of 
foreign (mostly American) rivals to whom they were losing business, and began hiring MBA talent 
from across the globe to fill executive and managerial positions (Lascelles 2005).   
16 Most significantly, Competition and Credit Control meant banks no longer set their interest rates 
collectively. 
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for corporate securities emerged, so large UK firms started making recourse to 
capital markets instead of banks to satisfy their external financial needs (Toporowski 
2005: 9). At the same time, the increasing presence of foreign banks operating in 
London also pushed down British banks’ profits.  
Against this background, in 1979, the Thatcher government permanently 
suspended capital controls. This undermined the remaining quantitative restrictions 
on the growth of bank balance sheets (the Supplementary Deposit Scheme or so-
called ‘corset’). With capital now able to flow freely across sovereign space, British 
banks could redirect clients to their overseas subsidiaries in order to issue loans they 
could not make directly from their home offices, while the non-bank public also 
started to avail themselves of funding in Euro-sterling markets (Howe 1994: 152). 
Given the ineffectiveness of bank credit controls in the context of capital 
liberalization, quantitative restrictions were abolished in 1980, followed by the 
abolition of the cash reserve ratio in 1981.17 
Freed from balance sheet restrictions, and with profits from wholesale lending 
reduced, British banks entered the retail mortgage market on an amplified scale in 
1980-81, in part to re-attract retail deposits.18 This shift in business strategy had a 
profound impact. In the short-term, intensified price competition undercut building 
societies’ profits. This contributed to the breakdown of the Building Societies 
Association (BSA) cartel in the 1980s which had been in place since 1939, once it 
became evident that, while the cartel protected building societies from one another, 
it did nothing to protect them from banks (Boléat 1987: 178).19 In the medium term, 
the new competition building societies faced encouraged them to lobby the 
_________________________ 
17 Geoffrey Howe, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, later recounted that the end of capital controls 
had been “an ambition that a number of us [Conservatives] had long cherished” but it had been “too 
sensitive to feature in our 1979 Manifesto” (Howe 1994: 130-131). A number of key contingences 
aided the Conservatives in the realization of their ambition, most notably the appreciation of sterling on 
foreign exchange markets following the discovery of North Sea oil and the crisis in the Middle East 
(Freud 1979). The abolition of exchange controls was also promoted by the City as a response to the 
lifting of capital controls in the US in 1974 (Helleiner 1994: 151).  
18 Given the inflationary context, houses were a good investment for banks since in case of foreclosure 
they could expect to possess title to an appreciating asset. 
19 The BSA cartel was originally formed to temper price competition between building societies 
during a period of low interest and profit margins (Boléat 1987). In later years, the cartel was justified 
as consistent with the philosophy of mutualism (Barnes 1984: 3) even though, as one critic later 
complained, if you were “single, or gay, or self-employed, and so on, then the building society was not 
interested” (Hird 1996: 42). With home mortgage loans constrained, mortgage queues were quite 
common in England during the 1960s and 1970s (Callen and Lomax 1990: 503). 
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government for regulatory reform, encapsulated in the 1986 Building Societies Act. 
The Act subsequently blurred the operational distinction between banks and building 
societies. As one building society senior manager at the time reflected: 
When the Building Societies Act came in 1986, as of 1987 the word profitability 
existed for the first time . . . as opposed to surplus of income over expenditure, 
stick it in the reserves. So people said ‘ooh profitability’, and that took them 
down the appropriate commercial road. ‘Well if we’re a business and now it is 
expected to make profits and maintain capital ratios we’ve got to have people 
from plc worlds that are used to doing that type of thing’...So then, ‘ooh crumbs, 
we are competing with [banks and other building societies], we are not just cosy 
lunch clubs anymore.’ That doesn’t  happen anymore, life is tough, we are one 
wolf pack against another wolf pack (quoted in Marshall et al. 2003: 741). 
Although the 1986 Act contained a number of important provisions, its long-
term legacy was to create the legal conditions of possibility for building societies to 
become banks at the close of the twentieth century; a demutualisation wave that 
would generate more new shareholders in the UK than all the other privatisations of 
British industry in the 1980s and 1990s combined (Martin and Turner 2000: 229). In 
1997, Northern Rock, along with a number of other British building societies, 
became a corporate body independent of the natural persons constituting it.  
3 Northern Wrecked 
From a legal perspective Northern Rock’s changed status from mutual building 
society to a proprietary corporation freed it from the restrictions imposed by the 
Building Societies Act 1986 (hereafter ‘BS Act’) 20 on permissible purpose or 
principal purpose (BS Act 1986, s 5(1) (a)), the range of powers it could exercise 
(BS Act 1986, ss 9(A) and 9(B)) and the characteristics of its balance sheet (ss 6 – 8 
BS Act 1986). It also changed the nature of its membership so that members no 
longer had to be either borrowers or share account holding investors (savers) in the 
society (BS Act 1985, s 119, Sched 2 para 5). Instead the register of members was 
opened up to any legal person and the involvement of external, often institutional, 
shareholders led to a real shift in the expectations and entitlements of investors. 
_________________________ 
20 As subsequently amended by the Building Societies Act 1997 and the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 but nothing in that amending legislation affects the points we make herein.  
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Indeed the differences between the two forms of organisation changed the context in 
which Northern Rock operated to such an extent that it reoriented the way Northern 
Rock’s directors perceived and discharged their duties and functions as a governing 
body in substantive ways that had profound effects a decade later.  
This was so despite the fact that the literal legal duties of directors of companies, 
being so broadly expressed, may not seem very different to the behaviours that 
Courts have expected from the officers of a building society in the course of their 
conduct of the business of the society in accordance with the society’s constitution 
as case law such as the 19th Century case of Sheffield and South Yorkshire 
Permanent Building Society v Aizlewood and others illustrates. This is no surprise 
since the Chancery Court borrowed from the long familiar duties of trustees when 
formulating the powers and duties of the officers of companies and building 
societies, which presented them with novel challenges in nineteenth century Britain. 
The duties owed at law by the members of building societies’ governing bodies are 
simply stated and widely understood as being to conduct the business of the society 
subject to the statutory framework set out in the BS Act 1986.21 To this end, the 
Building Societies legislation envisaged that the membership of the society upon its 
establishment would take the lead in delimitation of the powers and duties of the 
board of directors (BS Act 1986, schedule 2, Part I paras 2(3) and 3(4)) subject to 
various statutory restrictions on interested contracts and self-dealing by directors 
similar to those contained in Companies legislation (BS Act 1986, Part VII). The 
memorandum of association by which a building society is formed and the 
constitutional rules by virtue of which it is governed, are expressed to bind its 
officers, as well as its members (BS Act 1986, sched 2, part I para 3(2)). This marks 
an important difference between building societies and companies because the 
constitutional documents of companies incorporated under Companies legislation 
have contractual effect so as to bind the company and the members (Companies Act 
1985, s14 replaced in 2009 by Companies Act 2006, s33) but not its officers who 
have historically been seen by the Courts as “outsiders” to the company for the 
purposes of giving the constitutional documents direct contractual effect as against 
the Directors, a principle that has flavoured company law since it was first 
_________________________ 
21 As amended by BS Act 1997 and now of course, since building societies require FSA authorisation,   
within the broader regulatory framework of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 Part V of 
which has imposed more specific obligations under the members of a governing body of a building 
society through the Approved Persons regime just as it does to directors of banks. 
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established in the 1915 case of Hickman v Kent & Romney Marsh Sheep Breeders 
Association Ltd.  
At first glance, this may seem little more than a technical legal point, but it 
resonates with our earlier research findings that, post-demutualisation, long standing 
(often employee) members of Northern Rock began to feel a far more tenuous link 
with the directors of the company, perceiving them as outsiders on a number of 
levels, to their original perceptions of the leadership of the organisation (Bholat et 
al. 2012). In 1997 when Northern Rock became a public company limited by shares 
incorporated under the (then applicable) Companies Act 1985, the duties owed by its 
Directors to the new company became those owed by all company directors, namely 
a bundle of fiduciary and common law duties represented by the accretion of over 
100 years of case law precedent, overlaid by specific statutory rules designed to 
buttress the fiduciary duty. Land mark decisions among this vast body of precedent 
range from the middle of the nineteenth century Aberdeen Railway Co v Blaikie 
Bros (1854) to more recent decisions such as Re D’Jan (1993), and examine in 
specific detail the responsibilities of both executive and non-executive directors in 
every size and type of company, in almost every sector. The net effect of all this 
case law, in which the judiciary strove to develop appropriate behavioural codes and 
liability rules for company directors charged with stewardship of incorporated 
enterprise behind the veil of limited liability, was to require them to act in the best 
interests of the company in good faith, with absolute integrity, and with a reasonable 
degree of competence and professionalism.  
Note that the duty is owed to the company and not, as a general rule, to the 
shareholders either collectively or individually (Percival v Wright (1902); Peskin v 
Anderson (2000), and nowhere in companies legislation or in case law have the 
functions of company directors been expressed as being to maximise the financial 
value of the shareholders stake in the company. Nonetheless Boards of Directors of 
public companies in Anglo-American jurisdictions have in practice seen “the 
interests of the company” as coterminous with “shareholder value” on the grounds 
that equity holders are not guaranteed a fixed return like other creditors and 
contractors, so maximizing the residual income available for distribution to stock 
investors optimises the performance of the firm as a whole (Martin et al. 2007: 81). 
While viewed by some scholars as a solution to the problem of separation of 
ownership and control identified by Berle and Means (1991) in their seminal work, 
the primacy of shareholder value has also been seen by critics as inconsiderate to the 
interests of other corporate stakeholders, such as suppliers, employees, managers, 
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creditors, and the community more broadly (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000; 
Fligstein 2001). This general critique of shareholder value strategy has particular 
purchase in the banking sector given that very little bank funding comes from equity 
(Macy and O’Hara 2003: 94). This has led to a host of legislative and non-legislative 
initiatives designed to enable the corporate governance framework to promote some 
of these interests when “the interests of the company” are under consideration by the 
Board.22  
But in practice this has been difficult to achieve. Why so considering that the 
literal nature of the legal duties owed by the directors of mutual and corporations are 
not so very different? What is so very different between the two organisational 
forms is the context in which those directors’ duties are exercised as a result of the 
differences between the nature and expectations of the voting membership of a 
public company from that of the voting membership of a building society. The 
members of a mutually owned building society do not have the same kind of 
financial interests that shareholders in a company do. Their expectations as to 
financial participation in the assets of the society are to share in the distribution of 
any surplus in the reserves upon its winding up. Beyond that, the Courts have 
refused to see membership in a mutual society as conferring any kind of free 
standing financial value or rights to participate financially in the society’s surpluses 
while it is a going concern (Money Markets International Stockbrokers Ltd v London 
Stock Exchange Ltd (2001); Needler Financial Services Ltd v Taber (2001)). This is 
in stark contrast to the bundles of rights that the Courts see a share in a company as 
conferring, for these are seen generally to confer a right to participate financially in 
the company’s surpluses by way of dividends while it is a going concern:  
A share in a company could not properly be likened to a sum of money settled 
upon and subject to executory limitations to arise in the future; it was rather to 
be regarded as the interest of the shareholder in the company, measured, for the 
purposes of liability and dividend, by a sum of money, but consisting of a series 
of mutual covenants entered into by all the shareholders inter se (Borland's 
Trustee v Steel Bros & Co Ltd 1901). 
_________________________ 
22 The most potentially significant legislative reform to date has been the adoption of the “enlightened 
shareholder value” test for Directors’ decision making whereby they are directed to have regard to a 
range of other interests beyond those of the shareholders,  enshrined in section 172 Companies Act 
2006.  
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So too, when it comes to the voting rights of members. There are material 
differences in the governance framework between the two organisational forms, 
since building society members exercise their interests through voting in a manner 
that is unrelated to the size of their financial interest but instead relates simply to 
their membership in the society. Building society members are individual savers 
with and borrowers from the society whose franchise at general meeting is usually 
along a one-member, one-vote pattern, with the size of their share or loan with the 
society irrelevant to their influence. In theory, there thus exists a shorter chain of 
connectivity between the governing body of a building society and the constituent 
members of the society than is the case in the governance framework that exists 
between public company directors and the anonymous institutions that largely own 
them, for these institutional investors will often have their own long chains of 
accountability to diverse and anonymous ultimate investors and beneficiaries in 
which real identities and voice can get lost, leading to further weakening of 
governance incentives (Gray 2004). This has a very real effect on the incentives 
operating on the Directors of each type of organisation and the strategies they 
pursue, as highlighted by the BSA in its response to the review of corporate 
governance of UK banks and other financial industry entities (2009): 
The relationship between the board and those to whom it is accountable is 
different in a mutual and a PLC. Building societies have individual members rather 
than the institutional shareholders that banks have. There are differing financial 
objectives in mutuals compared to PLCs—for example, in normal times many 
mutuals seek to narrow their margins in order to give their customers—who mostly 
are also their members, a better deal.  PLCs tend to seek to widen margins in order 
to deliver dividends to shareholders. 
Despite the fact that, ever since the decision in Percival v Wright, directors of 
companies have been told time and again by the Courts that their duties are owed in 
law to the company as a whole and not directly to the shareholders individually or 
collectively, just like many other companies across the Anglo-American world, 
Northern Rock’s board after demutualisation conflated its duties to the firm to duties 
to shareholders. As the former Chairman of the Northern Rock Board Sir John 
Riddell once declared, “I have no time for the argument that concentration on 
shareholder value conflicts with the interests of other stakeholders. A single-minded 
drive to increase shareholder value carries with it, necessarily, the primacy of first-
class service to the customer, and support for our workforce and for the North-East” 
(Northern Rock 2001: 4). 
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Figure 2: The ‘Virtuous Circle’ 
 
Data Source: Northern Rock Annual Report 2003 
Figure 2 encapsulates the strategic vision of the firm in a business model the 
company referred to as “the virtuous circle.” The circular metaphor was apropos: 
while the firm’s pursuit of profits generated frequent changes in products and 
pricing, its goal remained the same: “Northern Rock’s strategy (plan) is to keep 
growing” (Northern Rock 2006a: 1). In general, Northern Rock delivered on its 
ambition. Between 1997 and 2007, Northern Rock’s total assets grew from £18 
billion to £113.5 billion, equivalent to an annual growth rate of 23.2 percent (Shin 
2009: 103), while its pre-tax profits increased 250 percent (Marshall et al. 2011: 4). 
The primary means through which Northern Rock hit its profit targets was by 
keeping costs low, particularly by leveraging low-cost labour in the North East. As 
the company stated in a Times 100 business case study titled Pursuing a Growth 
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Strategy, “A key advantage (of Northern Rock) over rivals is that its Head Office 
and key operational units are located in north east England where wages are, on 
average, lower than in the rest of the UK” (2006: 123). As a consequence, even as 
the company increased its staff by 3,000 people between 1997 and 2007, 
employment growth was primarily in low-skill, relatively low-wage work 
“comprising approximately one third call centre staff such as telesales and data 
processing, one third retail and commercial banking staff, and the remainder in 
administration, processing, and general management predominately supporting 
telebanking” (Marshall et al. 2011: 5).  
Thus although Northern Rock was often viewed before the crisis as “a symbol of 
the North East’s renaissance” (Elliot and Atkinson 2008: 49), the reality was that the 
firm re-entrenched the region’s precarious position within the national and 
international division of labour “where it has relied on call centres, administrative 
and clerical support offices in the public and private sector to replace traditional 
industrial and manufacturing branch plant decline” (Dawley et al. 2011: 5). 
Moreover, the spatial agglomeration of the company’s staff in the North East also 
contained costs by reducing rental and property costs. In 2007, the company had 
only 72 branch offices (House of Commons Treasury Committee 2008: 67). In lieu 
of an elaborate branch network, Northern Rock instead generated sales through 
independent financial advisers (IFAs). By 2007, 90 percent of Northern Rock’s new 
mortgage business was coming through intermediaries (Sage and Patel 2007: 3) and 
90 percent of all mortgage applications were submitted via the Internet through 
Northern Rock’s digital platform “Tracker Online” (Northern Rock 2007: 6). In this 
respect, Northern Rock exemplified a larger pattern within the British banking sector 
in recent years whereby the origination, funding, servicing, and monitoring of loans 
have become discrete and fragmented processes (Casu et al. 2006: 248).  
Together, Northern Rock’s limited infrastructure and low-cost labour enabled 
the firm to have the lowest cost-to-income ratio among British banks in the years 
leading up to the crisis. In turn, the company passed these savings on to consumers 
in the form of lower rates on mortgages, especially during the 1990s and early 2000s 
when the firm’s often market-leading rates attracted a large volume of potential 
borrowers, from which the firm selected those with the lowest credit risk. 
Specifically, Northern Rock operated a policy that required seven out of every ten 
new customers to have a history of credit repayment (Northern Rock 2006b: 8). As a 
result of this policy, most of Northern Rock’s lending was to second-time home 
buyers and for remortgages (Northern Rock 2006b: 41), with net lending to first-
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time home buyers averaging just 25 percent. The logic behind the strategy was that 
by lending to borrowers with certified credit histories, the company would have 
lower default rates and overall lower costs compared to rivals. As one financial 
analyst report concluded in 2004, “Northern Rock has the lowest risk profile of any 
UK bank” (Hamilton and Bergoe 2004: 1). 
Indeed the remarkable aspect of Northern Rock’s growth story is that it largely 
occurred without any noticeable decline in conventional key risk indicators. In 
general, Northern Rock regularly reported mortgage arrears at or below half the 
bank industry average, and recorded similarly low repossession rates. These 
impressive results were the product of Northern Rock’s generally solid underwriting 
standards. The company had limited exposure to loans in what are conventionally 
viewed as higher risk areas, such as business lending, credit cards, and insurance. In 
terms of residential lending, the company diversified nationally and had a limited 
number of buy-to-let and second charge mortgages on its books. The company also 
had limited exposure to large loans, with only about 5 percent of residential 
mortgages exceeding £500,000 in 2006. This remarkable, apparently riskless growth 
left many financial analysts with the impression that the firm had few faults. As 
equity analysts at ill-fated ABN AMRO wondered, “Northern Rock: How does it do 
it?” (Davies et al. 2003). The company was thus riddled with contradictions even the 
brightest analysts could not solve. Here was a firm both geographically expansive in 
its sources of funding and highly concentrated in terms of its labour force; the 
highest rated bank stock in Europe at the start of 2007, but also the most highly 
leveraged (Onado 2009: 104). 
But with hindsight the virtuous circle was not without its vices. The embrace of 
the ethos embodied in the virtuous circle caused the company to adopt a range of 
strategic targets by which to measure its performance, most prominently, 20 percent 
growth in profits to shareholders, plus or minus 5 percent, and 20 to 25 percent 
return on equity (Northern Rock 2007: 34). At the same time, and particularly after 
2003, the Rock lost its cost competitive edge, as other mortgage providers replicated 
the firm’s products and pricing. Here the challenges Northern Rock faced should not 
be viewed in isolation but seen as symptomatic of the banking sector as a whole in 
the period after the millennium. These challenges are explicable by the interpretive 
framework outlined in the article’s introduction. Specifically, the challenges banks 
faced occurred because exuberant profit targets, justified on the basis of shareholder 
value, generated price competition; competition reduced net interest margins and the 
rate of return of banking books; and lower profit rates induced the banking system as 
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a whole to increase the volume of debt, thus making its cumulative repayment less 
and less likely. While these dynamics appeared as exogenous profit pressures from 
the perspective of each individual bank, they were, in fact, endogenously constituted 
by the system as a whole (Bisias et al. 2012: 48). From this perspective, banks 
played a constitutive role in their own crisis. 23 
Northern Rock is illustrative. As its NIM narrowed, the firm massively increased 
the volume of loans to return profits (Figure 3). By the first half of 2007, Northern 
Rock’s share of net mortgage lending had increased to 18.9 percent, making it the 
UK’s biggest mortgage lender during that period (Chen 2007: 2). As part of these 
efforts, Northern Rock began marketing its now infamous “Together Loan” through 
which borrowers received loans for 125 percent of the market value of their home 
purchase, and up to six times their annual income (Brummer 2008: 10). Rather than 
hold these mortgages on balance sheet, Northern Rock increasingly marketed them 
to investors. Consequently, the percentage of customer loans securitized by Northern 
Rock increased from 0.6 percent in 1999 (the first year Northern Rock sold 
residential mortgage-backed securities) to 46 percent by 2006 (Milne and Wood 
2008: 10). At the same time, the firm tried to increase its non-interest income by 
marketing insurance policies written by Legal & General Assurance Company, as 
well as by selling sub-prime mortgages on behalf of soon-to-be-doomed American 
investment banking firm Lehman Brothers. 
The rest of the Northern Rock story is well-known. In order to fund its mortgage 
securitisation program, Northern Rock increasingly relied on wholesale funding 
rather than retail deposits, in a fashion similar to what occurred at Royal Bank of 
Scotland (Financial Services Authority 2011). As a result, on 9 August 2007, when 
inter-bank markets came to a standstill following months of bad news in financial 
markets, Northern Rock was acutely compromised. Although the retail queues 
outside the bank were still a month away, a run on the Rock by institutional 
investors had occurred invisibly because of their unwillingness to roll over the 
firm’s short-term debt. As CEO Adam Applegarth later lamented, “The world 
changed on August 9” (as quoted in Jones 2007). 
_________________________ 
23 The endogenous view of the banking crisis can be contrasted with exogenous views that explain it 
on the basis of high rates of savings in Asian economies, most notably China. According to this view, 
the resultant “global savings glut” (Bernanke 2005) lowered global interest rates, which in turn 
increased (financial) investment in recipient countries, most notably the US, whilst such low interest 
rates additionally inspired a “search for yield” among investors, encouraging their holding of 
comparatively riskier assets, such as US sub-prime mortgage backed securities (Financial Services 
Authority 2009: 14). For a critical view of the exogenous narrative see Borio and Disyatat (2011).  
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Figure 3: Net Lending and NIM 
 
Data Source: Northern Rock Annual Reports and Accounts various years. 
4 Conclusion 
Much of the emergent literature on systemic risk focuses on the problems posed 
from network homogeneity rooted in positive asset correlations and common 
counterparty exposures. The basic argument is that high degrees of firm integration 
potentially render the financial system less durable and more vulnerable to collapse. 
This negative appraisal of the effects of bank interconnectedness on financial 
stability is historically remarkable. Suffice to recall that many economic historians 
credit Britain’s highly concentrated branch network system for helping her weather 
the Great Depression, while one-third of firms failed in the unit bank-dominated US 
system (Billings and Capie 2011). Such considerations, however, by no means 
undermine the fundamental insight of the nascent systemic risk literature that 
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diversification in assets and ideas matters mightily to the long-term viability of the 
financial system (Haldane 2009).  
In that spirit, this article has identified organisational sources responsible for 
imposing uniformity in financial services beyond balance sheet linkages. In 
particular, an historical perspective on Northern Rock and the residential mortgage 
market in the UK offers a cautionary tale against legal reductionism i.e. the tendency 
to conflate financial firms with the limited liability corporate form, to the exclusion 
of other enterprise models, such as partnerships, producer cooperatives, the 
consumer mutual, and, of particular significance in the history of British commerce, 
the family firm (Herrigel 2006). As a recent report by the Oxford Centre for Mutual 
& Employee-owned Business (2009: 10–11) concluded, “A financial system 
populated by a diversity of ownership structures is likely to be...systemically less 
risky than one populated either by all plcs or all mutuals” because “the more 
diversified is a financial system in terms of size, ownership and structure of 
businesses, the better it is able to weather the strains produced by...an uncertain 
market environment” (cf. Haldane and Nelson 2012: 20).  
In particular, this article has suggested that the spread of a corporate 
monoculture in banking valorising shareholder value has been an important, 
historically specific source of systemic risk. As the back offices of corporate banks 
have substituted for locally based building society branches as the main providers of 
mortgage finance in Britain, valuable grounded knowledge of the local economy 
may have been lost, displaced by numerical credit scores that, by themselves, may 
be poor indicators of credit risk (Rajan 2010: 129). Of course, building societies and 
the mutual form are hardly perfect, as the recent Dunfermline crisis makes plain. 
Our aim has thus not been to advocate any particular policy, but more humbly to 
emphasise that the predominance of the profit-maximizing, limited liability 
corporate organisation in British banking is contextually contingent. Before the 
twentieth century, most banks were private partnerships, and most deposit takers 
were cooperatives.24 To the extent that corporate banks did exist, the unlimited 
liability of their investors balanced their risk-reward calculus.25   
The issue of organisational diversity and legal plurality we have raised in this 
article acquires renewed purchase at present. In January 2012 new legislation was 
_________________________ 
24 Monetary financial institutions encompass banks, building societies, and credit unions; in other 
words, institutions taking deposits and granting loans. 
25 Bank shareholders gained statutory permission for limited liability in 1862. 
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implemented to govern the UK credit union sector.26 Among other provisions, the 
Legislative Reform (Industrial and Provident Societies and Credit Unions) Order 
2011 relaxed criterion for credit union membership, allowing the admittance of 
corporations as members for the first time.27 In addition, credit unions are now able 
to offer fixed interest-bearing deposits, and the dividend they pay on member shares 
is no longer capped at eight percent per year. In implementing these legislative 
reforms, the stated goal has been to remove “obstacles to profitability” (HM 
Treasury 2009: 18) which have purportedly hampered the growth of British credit 
unions. Thus credit unions are now able to charge their members for payment 
services above cost i.e. for-profit.  
But in reflecting on these legislative changes, the history of British building 
societies should give pause for reflection. As the Northern Rock story shows, legal 
reforms that prospectively increase profit pressures on mutual cooperatives and 
render them more similar to contemporary corporate banks carries potential risks 
both for those firms and the financial system as a whole. In an uncertain world, 
history teaches that long-term economic innovation and social resilience is best 
promoted by cultivating a plurality of activities and values, rather than creating an 
institutional environment in which the maximization of short-term profitability 
enjoys singular prominence.       
 
Acknowledgement: This article does not necessarily reflect those of any of our employers. 
 
  
_________________________ 
26 Like banks and building societies, credit unions take deposits and grant loans, with the caveat that 
loans are generally granted only to those with deposits (“member shares”).  
27 As well, credit union members no longer need to demonstrate a single “common bond” but can be 
related through “common bonds” (plural), and the percentage of non-common bond membership 
permitted has been increased. 
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